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Gary W. Pendleton (2564)
Attorney for Raymond Lowe
150 North 200 East, Suite 202
St. George, Utah 84770
Ph: 628-4411
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ST. GEORGE THRIFT AND LOAN,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
RAYMOND L. LOWE,
Defendant.

RAYMOND L. LOWE,
Civil NO. 910500109 DC
Third-Party Plaintiff,
(James L. Shumate)

vs.
GREGORY A. KNOX,
Third-Party Defendant.

The matter came on for hearing on Third-Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment on July 22,1992. Third-Party Plaintiff appeared by and through its attorney, Gary
W. Pendleton, and Third-Party Defendant appeared in person. Having read the memoranda
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filed in support of and in opposition to the pending Motion for Summary Judgment and having
reviewed the file and the deposition of Third-Party Defendant and being fully advised in the
premises, the Court made the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On April 2, 1986, Third-Party Plaintiff as seller and Third-Party Defendant
as purchaser entered into a contract for the purchase of a certain residence.
2. In connection therewith, Third-Party Defendant executed a trust deed note in
favor of Third-Party Plaintiff in the principal amount of $68,900.00, bearing interest at the rate
of 12% per annum.
3. On April 4,1986, Third-Party Defendant also executed a Guaranty Agreement
in favor of Third-Party Plaintiff.
4. The subject trust deed note was thereafter assigned to St. George Thrift and
Loan for the purpose of securing an obligation which Third-Party Plaintiff owed to that
institution.
5. Thereafter, Third-Party Defendant defaulted in the payment of the subject
obligation and St. George Thrift and Loan, through regular non-judicial proceedings,
foreclosed the subject trust deed note by a sale conducted on October 8, 1991.
6. On October 8, 1991, the fair market value of the subject property did not
exceed $58,000.00.
7. A deficiency in the amount of $25,987.00 arose in connection with the
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foreclosure sale.
8. On December 30, 1991, St. George Thrift and Loan assigned Third-Party
Plaintiff the right to pursue the deficiency against Third-Party Defendant.
9. Third-Party Plaintiff initiated this action for the purpose of recovering the
balance of the obligations due under the terms of the subject trust deed note from Third-Party
Defendant.
10. Third-Party Defendant defends on the theory that Third-Party Plaintiff
misrepresented the value of the subject residence.
11. Third-Party Defendant is a graduate of J. Reuben Clark Law School.
12. Third-Party Defendant concedes that Third-Party Plaintiff in negotiating the
sale of the subject residence, never made any statement about the appraised value of the
property but merely advised that the Third-Party Defendant of the Third-Party Plaintiffs
asking price.
13. Third-Party Defendant however contends that Third-Party Plaintiff was in
possession of "special knowledge" regarding other factors which impacted upon the value of
the property which included (1) the timetable for the construction of the roadway which now
connects the east end of St. George Boulevard with the Panorama Park area and (2) the
ownership of adjacent property.
14. Third-Party Defendant contends that Third-Party Plaintiff misrepresented
the status of the funding available for the completion of the above-mentioned roadway and that
3
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the roadway was not completed for a period of two years after third-party Plaintiff anticipated
its completion.
15. Concerning the allegation that Third-Party Plaintiff misrepresented the
ownership of the adjacent property, Third-Party Defendant has testified as follows:
Q. And therefore, you felt that even if it was going to take three to five
thousand dollars to bring the property up to $69,500.00 in value, that
you had not been injured or hadn't entered into an unadvantageous [sic]
bargain?
A. That's correct. And also I was influenced by the representation
concerning the road. And there was one other representation that he
made which was concerning the fact that behind the property line was
BLM land. And he said that because it was BLM land that the view
would not be obstructed.
Q. Was it BLM land?
A. I don't know.
Q. Do you claim anything by that representation?
A. Yes.
Q. What do you claim?
A. I claim that if, in fact, it's not BLM - well, the inference was that the
view would not be obstructed.
Q. Has the view been obstructed?
v

A. I understand that it has to a degree. Yes. I don't know that. I
haven't been out to look at it. But I am told that it has.
Q. Do you claim that affected the value of the property?
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A. I claim that at the time of the transaction that it influenced my
perception of the value of the property.
Q. Did it in fact affect the value of the property?
A. I don't know.
16. Other than the foregoing, Third-Party Defendant cannot identify any item
which Third-Party Defendant contends to constitute a misrepresentation of material fact.
17. Immediately upon purchasing the property, Third-Party Defendant hired an
appraiser by the name of C.G. Miller who opined that the subject property would be worth
$69,500.00 upon the completion of certain improvements costing between three and five
thousand dollars.
18. Mr. Miller provided his opinion regarding the subject property by a letter to
Third-Party Defendant dated May 1, 1986.
19. After reviewing Miller's appraisal, Third-Party Defendant concluded that he
had not entered into a bad bargain, given the low down payment and buyer financing which
was available under the terms of the agreement between Third-Party Plaintiff and Third-Party
Defendant.
20. Third-Party Defendant's trust deed note originally came due in a balloon
payment which was to be paid in 1989.
21. In 1989, Third-Party Defendant approached Third-Party Plaintiff and raised
the issues of the delay in the completion of the above-mentioned roadway and the ownership
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of the adjacent property and, as the result of ensuing negotiations, obtained a two-year
extension of the subject trust deed note.
22. Third-Party Defendant contends that he has not waived his claims for
misrepresentation and in that connection has testified:
Q. So in connection with the extension in 1989, you raised the funding of
the road and the representation regarding the view of the property or the
view that was enjoyed from the property?
A. That's correct.
Q. Your position is that basically you had waived any claim arising out
of any misrepresentation in that connection in exchange for the
extension, is that what you're saying?
A. That was what I attempted to do when I negotiated with Mr. Lowe.
However, Mr. Lowe did not concede either of these issues. He denied
them both, as a matter of fact.
Q. Alright. But you raised them. And, in connection with these claims,
that you asserted, you received the two-year extension?
A. That's correct.
Q. And would you consider that to be, and I'll use this term since you are
law-trained, would you consider that to be an accord and satisfaction in
connection with these two claims?
A. I would not because of the fact that he did not concede them.
Q. So unless somebody concedes a claim that you are making, that your
assertion of that claim, in your opinion, cannot provide consideration for
extension?
A. I'm not saying that at all. I just know - there may be — I haven't
researched that, you know. I mean, I wouldn't -- you noticed I didn't
6
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raise those issues in my defense, but I'm not saying that - no, because I
don't know for sure. But I'm not - I didn't raise those in my defense.
33. Furthermore, Third-Party Defendant sold his interest in the subject property
in 1989 for the sum of $68,900.00.
34. Third-Party Defendant then later repurchased the property from the party
to whom he had sold it. Again, the purchase price was $68,900.00.
35. Third-Party Plaintiff has reasonably incurred attorney's fees in the amount
of $2,000.00 in the prosecution of this action and has reasonably incurred court costs totaling
$265.50.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. After having obtained possession of the subject real property and the letter of
opinion from C.G. Miller, Third-Party Defendant had full opportunity to discover any alleged
fraud or mistake and nevertheless failed to make further inquiry regarding the fair market value
of the subject real property notwithstanding the fact that reason would have dictated such
action.
2. Accordingly, any claim based upon allegation of fraud or mistake would have
been barred under the provisions of U.C.A. 78-12-26(3) from and after May 10, 1989.
3. Furthermore, in the event an action for innocent misrepresentation is governed
under the provisions of U.C. A. 78-12-25(3), any such cause would have been barred under that
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statute from and after May 10, 1990,
4. Accordingly, Third-Party Defendant's counterclaim should be dismissed on
the basis that said counterclaim is barred by operation of the statute of limitations.
5. Third-Party Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Third-Party Defendant
in the amoimt of $25,987.00, together with prejudgment interest at the contract rate, 12% per
annum, from and after October 9,1991, to date of judgment, costs of court in the amount of
$265.50, and attorney's fees under the provisions of the subject trust deed note in the amount
of $2,000.00.
LET JUDGMENT BE RENDERED ACCORDINGLY.
DATED this
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MAILING CERTIFICATE day of July, 1992,1 did personally mail a
I do hereby certify that on this
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Notice to:
Gregory A. Knox
1158 JudsonSt.
Redlands, Calif 91274

Michael D. Hughes
Attorney at Law
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770

Secretary
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Gary W. Pendleton (2564)
Attorney for Raymond Lowe
150 North 200 East, Suite 202
St. George, Utah 84770
Ph: 628-4411
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR
WASHINGTON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ST. GEORGE THRIFT AND LOAN,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
RAYMOND L. LOWE,
Defendant.

RAYMOND L. LOWE,
Civil NO. 910500109 DC
Third-Party Plaintiff,
(James L. Shumate)

vs.
GREGORY A. KNOX,
Third-Party Defendant.

The matter came on for hearing on Third-Party Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment on July 22,1992. Third-Party Plaintiff appeared by and through his attorney, Gary
W. Pendleton, and Third-Party Defendant appeared in person Having read the memoranda
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filed in support of and in opposition to the pending Motion for Summary Judgment and having
reviewed the file and the deposition of Third-Party Defendant and being fully advised in the
premises, the Court made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and entered judgment
as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Third-Party
Plaintiff, Raymond L. Lowe, have and recover judgment against Third-Party Defendant,
Gregory A. Knox, as follows:
$25,987.00 principal
2,468.77 prejudgment interest at 12% from 10/9/91
265.50 costs of court
_2JHHLM attorney's fees
$30,721.27 TOTAL JUDGMENT
together with interest at the rate of 12% per annum thereafter until the judgment is paid in full.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the ThirdParty Defendant's Counterclaim against Third-Party Plaintiff is hereby dismissed with
prejudice and upon the merits on the basis that said claim is barred by operation of the statute
of limitations.
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Distfict Judge
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify-that on this
-day of July, 1992,1 did personally mail a
true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Notice to:
Gregory A. Knox
1158 Judson St.
Redlands, Calif 91274

Michael D. Hughes
Attorney at Law
148 East Tabernacle
St. George, Utah 84770

Secretary
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